The Power of Language and Society When Defining What Sexuality Means

[The page numbers I cited are different from the class text; I used a copy of the article from the Summer 1980 publication of Signs, Vol. 5 No. 4]

Both Rupp and Rich discuss the power of language and social systems when defining sexuality and experiences between “same-sex” individuals.

Rupp chooses the term “same-sex sexuality” as a substitute for “queer,” “gay,” “lesbian,” or “homosexual” and proceeds to explain why this term is also inadequate, as many acts cannot be defined as same-sex and sexuality is a highly contested word which changes in meaning depending on context. She begins by contesting the “same” part of the term, arguing that many relationships, even if they are between two individuals who identified the same sexually (males in Athens or Japan, lesbians), often encompass some difference between the individuals, whether it be class, age, or gender identification (Rupp, 2001, p. 288). Using the term “same-sex” may be imposing a label on these relationships that was not previously associated with the specific actions in different cultural contexts. If the term “same-sex” is used, it should apply to relations in which all factors, including sex, gender, age, class, race, and others are actually the same.

Individuals who Westerners may identify as engaging in same-sex activities may actually be involved with “different-sex” activities, in which one person dresses or acts like a member of the other sex. Once again, language serves to confine how sexual relations are identified and limits the extent of their mean. Transgender and third-gender individuals within specific cultural groups, such as alyhas and hwames from Mohave Native American tribes in the western United States, mahus from Polynesian cultures, hijras from India, and transvestis from Brazil, complicate how sexual relationships can be defined with Western language, as these cultures have specific names for these individuals and acts which Westerners define as “sexual” (291-292).

Rupp introduces the concept of a “spectrum of transgendered relations” (293-294), which begins to complicate what different cultures define as “sex” or “sexuality” and what interactions are encompassed within these terms. Westerners may view an act involving the genitals of one person as sexual, while a different culture may view it as a social practice, spiritual tradition, rite of passage, or simply an action without sexual connotation. Sometimes these interactions involve the domination of one person over another; therefore, should they be defined as “same-sex domination” (295-296) or is that introducing potential violence into the interaction which may not exist or may not be politically correct? Rupp ultimately determines that language is imperfect to define these relations and finds that the term “same-sex sexuality,” which she has identified as flawed, is what she finds to be the best term, even though it does not encompass most relations.

Rich explores the problem and manifestations of compulsory heterosexuality in society and the invisibility and negative status of lesbians within this society. She expresses that lesbianism is often trivialized or merely tolerated, and that feminism does not always address the issues of lesbian women. She cites four recent “feminist” texts which did not address the problem of compulsory heterosexuality and therefore could not adequately encompass the experience of lesbianism. The book For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts’ Advice to Women by Ehrenreich and English presents the idea that a male, capitalist, consumerist discourse has prevailed around issues in female medicine. While this may be a valid point, the authors do not write about the negative effect this has on lesbian individuals. The text Toward a New Psychology of Women by Miller ignores the experience of lesbians completely. Other authors mention the “sexual division of labor,” which leads to gender inequality, but neglect to investigate the effect of this on lesbians. Historically, heterosexuality has been affirmed, even by those who claim to identify its biases and pitfalls.

Rich then explores what Kathleen Gough has identified as the “eight characteristics of male power in archaic and contemporary societies [which] produc[e] sexual inequality” (Rich, 1980, p. 638). Rich writes that a counterforce must act against these forces of power, in some ways portraying men as the only perpetrators of oppression against females. Capitalist systems require that someone must be at the bottom; why must it be those who identify their sex as female? “Women live subject to men” (643) and males’ sexual advances are supposed to be accepted by women without resistance and women must sacrifice in the workplace to survive. Men are characterized by their rampant sex drive, which must be satisfied by women. Even the term “consent” seems to be constructed; do women actually get to choose or do they feel obligated. Rich, as Rupp does, identifies that language is a shortcoming to identifying oppression against women and therefore working to end that oppression. “Enforc[ing] heterosexuality [ ] assur[es] male right of physical, economical, and emotional access (647).

The third section of Rich’s text brings up a concept Prof. Meika Loe has spoken about at numerous times on campus: the idea of a lesbian continuum, which includes the experience of all women with other women, not only women who identify as lesbian. It is the sense of emotional closeness and intimacy (not necessarily sexual) that women may experience to varying degrees throughout their lives. This continuum can be a way to identify the strength and power existing between women as a unique and valuable experience separate from societal preferences for heterosexual relationships. Some works of literature, including The Girl by LeSueur and Sula by Toni Morrison (one of my favorite fiction writers), represent closeness between women and the true intentions of a lesbian continuum.

Problems result with the idea of a lesbian continuum when women experience closeness with other women because they hate men, not because they find that they derive power from their experiences with women. The ultimate solution would be an element of choice; a feeling that women are not obligated to live heterosexual lives but instead can choose who they are in relationship with without consequence or scorn.